We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership 22 for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. 23 We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a fail- 
Introduction

36
Imagine that you are walking in the streets of Paris and that, while walking by Notre Dame de Paris, a thought suddenly 37 pops in your mind, say, ''Kill God'' (Frith, 1992) . Imagine also that this thought does not feel like your own, but feels like it is 38 somebody else's that has been inserted in your mind. For some people such an experience can feel as real as, say, their expe-39 rience of the church of Notre-Dame in front of their eyes. The presence of such delusional experiences is a first-rank diag-40 nostic symptom of schizophrenia (Schneider, 1959) , a symptom called Thought Insertion (henceforth, TI). More precisely, in TI 41 ''the subject experiences thoughts which are not his own intruding into his mind. The symptom is not that he has been 42 caused to have unusual thoughts, but that the thoughts themselves are not his'' (Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1983 , our empha- As both the above definition and these examples suggest, prima facie TI seems to affect at least two phenomenal proper-54 ties that normally accompany our episodes of thinking: first, the feeling or sense that our thoughts belong to us-sense of 55 ownership (henceforth, SoO)-and, second, the feeling or sense that we are the causal generator of our thoughts-sense of 56 agency (henceforth, SoA). 57 In trying to explain TI, we are confronted with several issues. First, we need to determine whether TI is best characterized 58 as primarily a disorder of the sense of thought agency, a disorder of the sense of thought ownership or a disorder reflecting a 59 disruption of both the sense of agency and the sense of ownership for thought. Second, as pointed out by Gallagher (2004) , 60 patients do not experience all their thoughts as inserted thoughts. An account of TI should therefore also explain its episodic 61 nature. Third, inserted thoughts are not just negatively characterized by loss of the SoA and/or the SoO, but also positively by 62 an attribution to an external entity postulated by patients to be the actual possessor or initiator of these special thoughts 63 (e.g., ''. . . the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind'', Mellor, 1970 , our emphasis). 1 
64
With respect to the first issue, TI is often viewed as reflecting a disturbance of the SoA rather than of the SoO. Following 65 Sousa and Swiney (2011), we call this view the standard approach. In Section 2, we will explain why we think this approach is 66 inadequate. In the following sections, we will argue for an alternative view according to which TI essentially reflects a deficit 67 of the SoO. We will propose the hypothesis that during the formation of some occurrent thoughts the causal factors (what we 68 call the causal-contextual information) that produce them are not dynamically integrated by the system. As a result, these 69 thoughts seem to come out of nowhere (we will argue that this constitutes the phenomenological basis of TI). Before present-70 ing our main hypothesis (Section 4), we will review empirical evidence showing that schizophrenia patients present system-71 atic integration deficits (Section 3). Finally (Section 5), we will discuss how, on this hypothesis, further distinctive features of 72 TI could be accounted for. 73 
The standard approach criticized
74
According to the standard approach, TI reflects a disturbance of the SoA for thoughts but leaves intact the SoO. One can 75 identify two main motivations for this approach and its denial that in TI the SoO is disturbed. One motivation for this ap-76 proach comes from the very influential role played by the comparator model of positive symptoms in schizophrenia pro- 77 posed by Christopher Frith (1992) . The second motivation comes from the inseparability thesis. 78 The comparator-model was originally developed to explain motor actions (e.g., Sperry, 1950) . Chris Frith (1992) , however, 79 invoked it to explain delusions of control -where agents experience their own actions as controlled by some external entity 80 -as well as several other delusions of passivity in schizophrenia, including TI (see also Campbell, 1999) . According to the 81 comparator-model, delusions of control reflect an impairment of the sense of agency for actions but leaves intact their sense 82 of ownership for the movements that constitute these actions: patients with delusions of control claim that some external 83 force controls their movements but do not deny that the movements thus controlled are movements of their own body. Frith (1992) assumed that thoughts could be analyzed as inner speech and hence could be treated as an action and applied 85 the comparator model to thought insertion. Over the last 20 years, the comparator model of delusions of control has become 86 far more sophisticated and has received significant empirical support. However, during the same period, the extension of the 87 comparator-model from action to thought has been largely criticized 3 and even the current partisans of the standard approach 88 usually reject the comparator-model for TI (e.g., Gallagher, 2004; Peacocke, 2007; Proust, 2009; Young, 2008 2008: 849). In other words, introspective awareness (of thoughts) is inseparable from the sense of subjectivity, understood 1 Gallagher also points out the need to explain why inserted thoughts seem circumscribed to specific contents. This point will be not addressed here, however.
2 Both the SoA for motor actions and the SoO for our body depend on the integration of multiple factors. On the one hand, the SoA is thought to rely on factors like the sensory attenuation of proprioceptive reafferences from voluntary movements, the perceptual effects of our actions and whether these effects were expected or not, the efferent signals linked to action initiation, the intention(s) preceding voluntary actions, the sense of effort experienced when executing an action and, finally, the control we have on the ongoing action (Pacherie, 2010) . On the other hand, the SoO results from the multisensory integration of inputs coming from different modalities (e.g., from vision and proprioception) (Ehrsson, 2012) . There is a partial overlap between the factors that determine the SoA and those involved in the SoO and, in ordinary situations and some neurological conditions, such as somatoparaphrenia, there is a close interplay between the SoA and the SoO (Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004 , de Vignemont, 2009 ). Nonetheless, we can find striking dissociations between these two feelings, with a preserved SoO despite an impaired SoA, both in schizophrenic patients (Frith, 2005) and in healthy subjects (Kalckert et al., 2012) . This indicates that the SoA may not be necessary for the SoO. In addition, a recent study with healthy subjects provides evidence that the presence or absence of a SoA over an action does not modulate the SoO for the relevant body part -i.e., the SoO is not stronger when the SoA is present than when it is absent -, and also that, in contrast, the presence or absence of a SoO for a particular body part modulates the SoA over the relevant action -i.e., the SoA is stronger when the SoO is present than when it is absent - (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012 agency (this is precisely the claim of the standard approach).
107
We think that (I2) is unwarranted and that it is wrong to identify the sense of ownership with the sense of subjectivity.
108
First, it should be noted that unless one can produce independent reasons for thinking that the sense of ownership is pre-109 served in TI, the argument is simply begging the question in favor of (I2). In addition, the phenomenology reported by pa-110 tients suffering from TI seems to provide evidence against (I2 domains. 4 Note that thought broadcasting, while perhaps the most characteristic, is not the only symptom whereby patients feel their thoughts leaving their mind. In thought withdrawal, for instance, patients feel that some of their thoughts are withdrawn by an external agency such that their own thoughts are felt as leaving their head (Koehler, 1979; Pawar & Spence, 2003) . 5 The following remarks apply to the standard approach in general, whether inspired by the comparator-model or not. 6 For Gallagher (2004) , what differentiates UT from TI is the attributive side of the latter where thoughts are attributed to an external agency. However it will be shown in the last section that this attributive process is not systematic and that when it occurs it is as a result of the loss of the SoO in TI. 7 Sousa and Swiney (2011) distinguish between two notions of SoA. This seems to give them the tools to differentiate between the two symptoms. e.g., proximity, similarity, closure and good continuation (Wertheimer, 1923) . content strictly conveyed by the target state; however, it will modulate the salience, the valence, or the relevance of the tar-189 get event, and thus its phenomenological quality. anisms ''that allow sensory systems to adapt and optimize their responses to stimuli within a particular surrounding In what follows we will try to show that TI may result from an integration deficit of some of these external, internal and 293 modulating factors. We just explained that a thought does not arise out of nowhere; rather a number of factors contribute to its emergence.
298
The integration of these causal-contextual factors with the content of thoughts is necessary to obtain a cohesive phenom-299 enology within our episodes of thinking. However, this coherence is a form of causal coherence rather than semantic coher-300 ence. A specific thought will be said to be causally coherent if the system integrated its causal source(s) so that the presence of 301 this thought within our stream of consciousness will feel ''natural'' and normal, independently of its semantic content. This 302 causal coherence determines a specific phenomenology of coherence that does not depend on the (semantic) content of 303 thoughts but on some functional processes that underlie the mechanisms of thought production. In contrast, semantic coher- 10 Of course, all thoughts are generated within a doxastic background. Nevertheless the crucial point is the weighting of the different factors within the current situation. So, the doxastic background will have more or less weight in the determination of the current thought according to the current situation.
308
Consider first the case in which the two kinds of phenomenology co-occur. For instance, when you are running an inner 309 soliloquy about a specific subject matter (e.g., solving a math problem), each particular thought is, at least partially, con-310 strained by (usually implicit) semantic expectations (or semantic predictions) derived from the preceding thought(s you were unable to retrieve this perceptual information later).
340
To recap, to produce phenomenal causal coherence the system must integrate the causal source(s) (i.e., the causal-con-341 textual information) of thoughts with the thoughts themselves. Now, we propose that the SoO for thoughts directly follows 342 from the production of phenomenal causal coherence (and not from semantic coherence). The establishment of causal coher-
343
ence is what prevents the irruption of a sense of non-ownership or dis-ownership. 12 When this integration process is dis-344 rupted, a thought, while occurring, will be disconnected from its causal source(s). It will then be experienced as coming out 345 of nowhere. Imagine now that you experience some of your thoughts as coming out of nowhere; their presence will likely feel 346 strange and abnormal so that your sense of ownership for these thoughts could be seriously disturbed. We suggest that this is 347 precisely what happens in TI. In other words, we hypothesize that in patients with TI, the processes responsible for the online 348 integration or coordination of the causal-contextual information pertaining to a thought with the thought itself is impaired.
349
That is to say, the link between causal context and thought is not dynamically maintained. As the result, these thoughts would 350 be experienced as coming from nowhere, and we would lack a SoO for them. In our view then, considering inserted thoughts as 351 decontextualized thoughts constitutes the better way of describing the phenomenological substrate of thought insertion.
352
In this view, the SoO for thoughts depends essentially on the integration of relevant causal-contextual information with less, we claim that causal integration is a necessary and sufficient condition for ownership, so that if it is absent the SoO will 356 be undermined.
357
But now what could be the functional impairment responsible for the disturbed integration of causal-contextual infor-358 mation in the production of episodes of thinking? 11 The system of course also integrates other information, as the broader context in which the soliloquy is taking place. That is about what it is (i.e., the ''superordinate task'' the subject is executing), such as the solving of a mathematical problem. This broader context will drive the general line of your soliloquy, selecting the more appropriate thoughts according to (at least) the current situation. In this respect, if you are fully concentrated on your problem, the sentences you will silently utter will be coherent with the superordinate task. Other things being equal, a sentence such as ''Pythagoras was not right about this'' will appear coherent with your solving problem task, but the sentence ''this bread is delicious'' will not. 12 The phenomenology of thought-ownership is difficult to characterize positively. It is not a vivid and highly salient part of our experience of thinking; rather, it is better described as recessive, occupying the margins of consciousness and involving a diffuse and harmonious sense that our thoughts are part of some harmonious flow and do not come out of nowhere. In addition, it is difficult to decide if TI is phenomenally characterized only by an absence of ownership (i.e., non-ownership) or more specifically by the presence of a negative sense of dis-ownership. However, these issues are not primordial for the present paper, so they are postponed for another occasion. to the extent that the conscious flow of thoughts is essentially, though not exclusively, a temporal phenomenon, the dis-364 turbed function is likely to be a function centrally involved in the linking of features across time. So, we suggest that the 365 integration deficit of causal-contextual information in the process of thought production is principally the result of working 366 memory impairments. 367 We can roughly define working memory (henceforth, WM) as the ability to maintain, manipulate and coordinate online a 
Thought insertion further explained
399
We have argued so far that TI is best characterized as primarily a disorder of the sense of thought ownership. However, an 400 account of TI should also explain the episodic nature of TI; i.e. why patients do not experience all their thoughts as inserted 401 and it should explain why the disowned thoughts are attributed to some alien agency. In addition, in Section 2 we criticized 402 the standard approach for failing to distinguish TI from related phenomena such as UT and IFT. We now turn to these further 403 challenges and discuss how they can be addressed on the present model, starting with the third one. While the standard approach failed to distinguish TI from other specific cases like UT and IFT, the present model provides 406 the tools needed to distinguish them. According to our hypothesis, TI is essentially a deficit of the SoO. We can therefore say 407 that what distinguishes that in IFT and UT, the former the SoO is preserved but the SoA is lacking. However, this answer 408 needs further elaboration, since TI is in a way very similar to UT, i.e., in both cases thoughts seem to arise in your mind auto-409 matically or spontaneously and are experienced as unwilled and unexpected. Prima facie then, unbidden thoughts look like 410 cases of decontextualized thoughts. Why is it that we still own these thoughts? 411 The intuitive answer is to say that UTs come out of the blue, because they lack semantic coherence with the thoughts that 412 precede them, but do not come out of nowhere, because causal coherence is retained. That is to say, the causal-contextual 413 information is integrated at the time of occurrence of the (unbidden) thought. This is what we suggested with the example of 414 the man who suddenly had the thought ''I must not forget my laptop for tonight's meeting'' pop in his mind while exercising 415 at the gym: the thought felt as coming out of the blue but not out of nowhere because the system integrated the (implicit or 416 explicit) memory factor that triggered this thought (see, Section 4). 13 Now, we need to detail how this works. seems to be at stake.
444
A second possibility is that in UT, but not in TI, some causal-contextual information was actually integrated with the rel-445 evant thought by online contextual integration processes. However this information would not be retrievable after the time of 446 occurrence of the relevant thought. The suggestion then is that in UT the contextual information that triggered the thought is 447 not processed extensively enough to be explicitly retrievable by the subject later in time, but nonetheless processed to such 448 an extent that the system integrates it with the relevant thought at the time around its occurrence. Turn back to the example 449 of Sarkosy. Perhaps your thought was originally triggered by a glimpsed picture of Sarkosy. However the amount of process-450 ing this information received was not sufficient for it to be maintained in working memory long enough to be retrievable 451 later when I asked you the reason for which you were thinking that. Now it is sufficient that the system maintained and coor-452 dinated the relevant causal-contextual information at the time the thought was generated for there to also occur a concurrent, good president, even several weeks later, you likely will still be prone to self-ascribe this thought. 464 Finally, there is evidence that subliminal information (i.e., the prime) presented before a target event can, in certain con-465 ditions, bias your behavioral response for this target (e.g., Naccache, 2006) . This means that some integration between the 466 unconscious information (the prime) and conscious information (the target) was achieved. So, a third possibility is that in UT 13 One anonymous reviewer for the present paper asked whether the explanation we offer for thought insertion could be extended to the case of primary delusions. Primary delusions are usually defined as delusions which arise ''out of the blue'' with no morbid antecedents or as beliefs that are not preceded by any other ideas or events. If we follow these definitions, perhaps the distinction between ''out of nowhere'' and ''out of the blue'' we draw in the paper is relevant to this issue. A thought (or a set of thoughts) will be said to be coming ''out of nowhere'' if causal coherence is lacking (leading to a disturbed sense of ownership), and ''out of the blue'' if semantic coherence is lacking. So, we may hypothesize that the phenomenological side of primary delusional beliefs (i.e., their lack of coherence with the person's belief system) may be explained by a disturbed semantic coherence (resulting, e.g., from a deficit in the prediction of upcoming thoughts), while causal coherence is preserved (explaining why patients do not disown their thoughts in this case). Why primary delusions have the contents they have and why they become firmly held beliefs are other matters, that fall outside of the scope of the present paper.
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to a specific human agent seems to be one kind of interpretation among others of the source of inserted thoughts rather than We first argued that viewing the phenomenon of thought insertion in schizophrenia as merely reflecting a disruption of 532 the sense of agency fails to adequately capture its phenomenology. We proposed instead that thought insertion primarily 533 involves a disruption of the sense of ownership and we defended the hypothesis that this disruption stems from a failure 534 in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in particular contextual information concerning 535 the different causal factors that may be implicated in its production. We argued that this failure could be explained by def- 
